Prelogical Relations  by Honsell, Furio & Sannella, Donald
Information and Computation 178, 23–43 (2002)
doi:10.1006/inco.2002.3115
Prelogical Relations1
Furio Honsell
Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica, Universita` di Udine, Italy
E-mail: honsell@dimi.uniud.it
URL: www.dimi.uniud.it/˜honsell/
and
Donald Sannella
Laboratory for Foundations of Computer Science, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
E-mail: dts@dcs.ed.ac.uk
URL: www.dcs.ed.ac.uk/˜dts/
Received August 31, 1999
We study a weakening of the notion of logical relations, called prelogical relations, that has many
of the features that make logical relations so useful as well as further algebraic properties including
composability. The basic idea is simply to require the reverse implication in the definition of logical
relations to hold only for pairs of functions that are expressible by the same lambda term. Prelogical
relations are the minimal weakening of logical relations that gives composability for extensional struc-
tures and simultaneously the most liberal definition that gives the Basic Lemma. Prelogical predicates
(i.e., unary prelogical relations) coincide with sets that are invariant under Kripke logical relations
with varying arity as introduced by Jung and Tiuryn, and prelogical relations are the closure under
projection and intersection of logical relations. These conceptually independent characterizations of
prelogical relations suggest that the concept is rather intrinsic and robust. The use of prelogical relations
gives an improved version of Mitchell’s representation independence theorem which characterizes ob-
servational equivalence for all signatures rather than just for first-order signatures. Prelogical relations
can be used in place of logical relations to give an account of data refinement where the fact that
prelogical relations compose explains why stepwise refinement is sound. C© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
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1. INTRODUCTION
Logical relations are structure-preserving relations between models of typed lambda calculus.
DEFINITION 1.1. A logical relation R over A and B is a family of relations {Rσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A ×
[[σ ]]B}σ∈Types() such that:
• Rσ→τ ( f, g) iff ∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A.∀b ∈ [[σ ]]B.Rσ (a, b) ⇒ Rτ (AppA f a, AppB g b).
• Rσ ([[c]]A, [[c]]B) for every term constant c : σ in .
Logical relations are used extensively in the study of typed lambda calculus and have applications
outside lambda calculus, for example to abstract interpretation [1] and data refinement [34]. A good
reference for logical relations is [19]. An important but more difficult reference is [33].
The Basic Lemma is the key to many of the applications of logical relations. It says that any logical
relation over A and B relates the interpretation of each lambda term in A to its interpretation in B.
LEMMA 1.2 (Basic Lemma). LetR be a logical relation overA and B. Then for all -environments
ηA, ηB such that R(ηA, ηB) and every term  ✄ M : σ, Rσ ([[ ✄ M : σ ]]AηA , [[ ✄ M : σ ]]BηB ).
Here, R(ηA, ηB) refers to the obvious extension of R to environments; see Section 3 below.
1 This is an extended and revised version of [9].
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As structure-preserving relations, logical relations resemble familiar algebraic concepts such as ho-
momorphisms and congruence relations but they lack some of the convenient properties of such concepts.
In particular, the composition of two logical relations is not in general a logical relation. This calls into
question their application to data refinement at least, where one would expect composition to provide
an account of stepwise refinement.
We propose a weakening of the notion of logical relations called prelogical relations (Section 3) that
has many of the features that make logical relations so useful—in particular, the Basic Lemma still holds
for prelogical relations (Lemma 4.1)—but having further algebraic properties including composability
(Proposition 5.6). The basic idea is simply to require the reverse implication in the definition of logical
relations to hold only for pairs of functions that are expressible by the same lambda term. Prelogical re-
lations turn out to be the minimal weakening of logical relations that gives composability for extensional
structures (Corollary 7.2) and simultaneously the most liberal definition that gives the Basic Lemma.
Prelogical predicates (the unary case of prelogical relations) coincide with sets that are invariant under
Kripke logical relations with varying arity as introduced by Jung and Tiuryn [10] (Proposition 6.2).
Moreover, prelogical relations are the closure under projection and intersection of logical relations
(Theorem 7.4). In view of these many conceptually independent characterizations, prelogical relations
appear to be a rather intrinsic and robust concept. The use of prelogical relations in place of logical
relations gives an improved version of Mitchell’s representation independence theorem (Corollaries 8.5
and 8.6 to Theorem 8.4) which characterizes observational equivalence for all signatures rather than
just for first-order signatures. Prelogical relations can be used in place of logical relations in Reynolds’
and Tennent’s account of data refinement in [34] and then the fact that prelogical relations compose
explains why stepwise refinement is sound.
Many applications of logical relations follow a standard pattern where the result comes directly from
the Basic Lemma once an appropriate logical relation has been defined. Some results in the literature
follow similar lines in the sense that a type-indexed family of relations is defined by induction on types
and a proof like that of the Basic Lemma is part of the construction, but the family of relations defined is
not logical. Examples can be found in Plotkin’s and Jung and Tiuryn’s lambda-definability results using
I-relations [23] and Kripke logical relations with varying arity [10] respectively, and Gandy’s proof of
strong normalization using hereditarily strict monotonic functionals [6]. In each of these cases, the family
of relations involved turns out to be a prelogical relation (Example 3.12, Section 6, and Example 3.13)
which allows the common pattern to be extended to these cases as well. Since prelogical relations
are more general than logical relations and variants like I-relations, they provide a framework within
which these different classes can be compared. Here we begin by studying and comparing their closure
properties (Proposition 5.7) with special attention to closure under composition.
See Section 11 for a discussion of related work.
2. SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS
We begin with λ→, the simply typed lambda calculus having → as the only type constructor. Other
type constructors will be considered in Section 10. We follow the terminology in [19] for the most part,
with slightly different notation.
DEFINITION 2.1. The set of types over a set B of base types (or type constants) is given by the grammar
σ ::= b | σ → σ where b ranges over B. A signature  consists of a set B of type constants and a
collection C of typed term constants c : σ . We write Types() for the set of types over B.
Let = 〈B, C〉be a signature. We assume familiarity with the usual notions of context  = x1 : σ1, . . . ,
xn : σn and -term M of type σ over a context , written  ✄ M : σ , with the meta-variable t reserved
for lambda-free -terms. When we need to make  explicit we write  ✄ M : σ . If  is empty then
we write simply M : σ . Capture-avoiding substitution [N/x]M is as usual.
DEFINITION 2.2. A -applicative structure A consists of:
• a carrier set [[σ ]]A for each σ ∈ Types ();
• a function Appσ,τA : [[σ → τ ]]A → [[σ ]]A → [[τ ]]A for each σ, τ ∈ Types ();
• an element [[c]]A ∈ [[σ ]]A for each term constant c : σ in .
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We drop the subscripts and superscripts when they are determined by the context, and we sometimes
abbreviate Appσ,τA f x as f x . Two elements f, g ∈ [[σ→τ ]]A are said to be extensionally equal if
Appσ,τA f x = Appσ,τA gx for every x ∈ [[σ ]]A. A -applicative structure is extensional when extensional
equality coincides with identity.
A -combinatory algebra is a -applicative structureA that has elements K σ,τA ∈ [[σ → (τ → σ )]]A
and Sρ,σ,τA ∈ [[(ρ → σ → τ ) → (ρ → σ ) → ρ → τ ]]A for each ρ, σ, τ ∈ Types () satisfying the equa-
tions K σ,τA xy = x and Sρ,σ,τA xyz = (xz)(yz).
An extensional combinatory algebra is called a Henkin model. An applicative structure A is a full
type hierarchy when [[σ → τ ]]A = [[σ ]]A → [[τ ]]A (the full set-theoretic function space) for every
σ, τ ∈ Types () with Appσ,τA f x = f (x) and then it is obviously a Henkin model.
In a combinatory algebra, we can extend the definition of lambda-free -terms by allowing them to
contain S and K ; we call these combinatory -terms.
A -environment ηA assigns elements of an applicative structureA to variables, with ηA(x) ∈ [[σ ]]A
for x : σ in . A lambda-free -term  ✄ t : σ is interpreted in a -applicative structure A under
a -environment ηA in the obvious way, written [[ ✄ t : σ ]]AηA , and this extends immediately to an
interpretation of combinatory -terms in combinatory algebras by interpreting K and S as KA and SA.
If t is closed then we write simply [[t : σ ]]A.
There are various ways of interpreting terms containing lambda abstraction in a combinatory algebra
by “compiling” them to combinatory terms so that outermost β holds (see Proposition 2.4 below for
what we mean by “outermost β”). In Henkin models, all these compilations yield the same result.
An axiomatic approach to interpreting lambda abstraction requires an applicative structure equipped
with an interpretation function that satisfies certain minimal requirements—cf. the notion of acceptable
meaning function in [19].
DEFINITION 2.3. A lambda -applicative structure consists of a -applicative structure A together
with a function [[·]]A that maps any term  ✄ M : σ and -environment ηA over A to an element of
[[σ ]]A, such that:
• [[ ✄ x : σ ]]AηA = ηA(x)
• [[ ✄ c : σ ]]AηA = [[c]]A
• [[ ✄ M N : τ ]]AηA = AppA[[ ✄ M : σ → τ ]]AηA [[ ✄ N : σ ]]AηA
• [[ ✄ λx :σ.M : σ → τ ]]AηA = [[ ✄ λy:σ.[y/x]M : σ → τ ]]AηA provided y ∈ 
• [[ ✄ M : σ ]]AηA = [[ ✄ M : σ ]]Aη′A provided η
′
A is a -environment such that ηA(x) = η′A(x)
for all x ∈ 
• [[, x : σ ✄ M : τ ]]AηA = [[ ✄ M : τ ]]AηA provided x ∈ FV(M).
The relationship between lambda applicative structures and combinatory algebras is as follows,
cf. [5].
PROPOSITION 2.4. A lambda applicative structure A such that AppA[[ ✄ λx :σ.M : σ → τ ]]AηAa =
[[, x : σ ✄ M : τ ]]AηA[x →a] amounts to a combinatory algebra, and vice versa.
Proof. ⇐: We define [[·]]A via the standard compilation of lambda terms using K and S to combi-
natory terms.
⇒: K σ,τA and Sρ,σ,τA are the interpretations of the usual lambda terms.
The proof of this proposition shows that the interpretation of lambda terms in combinatory algebras
via compilation to combinatory terms satisfies the axioms in Definition 2.3 and the additional property
in the proposition. Therefore when viewing a combinatory algebra as a lambda applicative structure,
this is the interpretation function we have in mind.
3. ALGEBRAIC AND PRELOGICAL RELATIONS
We propose a weakening of the definition of logical relations which is closed under composition and
which has most of the attractive properties of logical relations. First we change the two-way implication
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in the condition on functions to a one-way implication which requires preservation of the relation under
application.
DEFINITION 3.1. Let A and B be -applicative structures. An algebraic relation R over A and B is
a family of relations {Rσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A × [[σ ]]B}σ∈Types () such that:
• If Rσ→τ ( f, g) then ∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A.∀b ∈ [[σ ]]B.Rσ (a, b) ⇒ Rτ (AppA f a, AppBgb).
• Rσ ([[c]]A, [[c]]B) for every term constant c : σ in .
In lambda applicative structures, we additionally require the relation to preserve lambda abstrac-
tion in a sense that is analogous to the definition of admissible relation in [19]. First, we extend a
family of relationsR= {Rσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A × [[σ ]]B}σ∈Types () to a relation on -environments: R(ηA, ηB) if
Rσ (ηA(x), ηB(x)) for every x : σ in .
DEFINITION 3.2. Let A and B be lambda -applicative structures. A prelogical relation over A and
B is an algebraic relation R such that given -environments ηA and ηB such that R(ηA, ηB), and a
term , x : σ ✄ M : τ , if Rσ (a, b) implies Rτ ([[, x : σ ✄ M : τ ]]AηA[x →a], [[, x : σ ✄ M : τ ]]BηB[x →b])
for all a ∈ [[σ ]]A and b ∈ [[σ ]]B, then Rσ→τ ([[ ✄ λx :σ.M : σ → τ ]]AηA , [[ ✄ λx :σ.M : σ → τ ]]BηB ).
This formulation of the definition amounts to defining prelogical relations as simply the class of
relations that make the Basic Lemma hold, as we shall see in Lemma 4.1 below. (Indeed, since the Basic
Lemma for prelogical relations is an equivalence rather than a one-way implication, an alternative at this
point would be to take the conclusion of the Basic Lemma itself as the definition of prelogical relations.)
A simpler and therefore more appealing definition is obtained if we consider combinatory algebras,
where the requirement above boils down to preservation of S and K . This is probably the formulation
that readers will most want to remember, although the definition for lambda applicative structures is
useful for proofs of syntactic properties of lambda calculus.
PROPOSITION 3.3. Let A and B be -combinatory algebras. An algebraic relation R over A and B
is prelogical iff R(Sρ,σ,τA , Sρ,σ,τB ) and R(K σ,τA , K σ,τB ) for all ρ, σ, τ ∈ Types ().
Proof. Directly from the definitions, using Proposition 2.4 for the inverse implication.
If we incorporate S and K into the signature , then prelogical relations are just algebraic relations
on combinatory algebras. One way of understanding the definition of prelogical relations is that the
reverse implication in the definition of logical relations is required to hold only for pairs of functions
that are expressible by the same lambda term. For combinatory algebras these are exactly the pairs
of functions that are denoted by the same combinatory term, and thus this requirement is captured by
requiring the relation to contain S and K .
The use of the combinators S and K in the above proposition is in some sense arbitrary: the same result
would be achieved by taking any other combinatory basis and changing the definition of combinatory
algebra and the interpretation function accordingly. It would be straightforward to modify the definitions
to accommodate other variants of lambda calculus, for instance λI (where in λx :σ.M , the term M is
required to contain x) for which a combinatory basis is B, C, I, S, or linear lambda calculi. For languages
that include recursion, such as PCF, one would add a Y combinator. For λunit,×,→, one could add pairing
etc. as suggested in Section 10 below or alternatively use the “categorical combinators” of [4] as in
Theorem 5.1 of [24].
As usual, the binary case of algebraic resp. prelogical relations over A and B is derived from the
unary case of algebraic resp. prelogical predicates for the product structure A× B. For instance:
DEFINITION 3.4. LetA be a -applicative structure. An algebraic predicate P overA is a family of
predicates {Pσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A}σ∈Types () such that:
• If Pσ→τ ( f ) then ∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A.Pσ (a) ⇒ Pτ (AppA f a).
• Pσ ([[c]]A) for every term constant c : σ in .
For most results about prelogical relations below there are corresponding results about prelogical
predicates and about algebraic relations and predicates over applicative structures. We omit these for
lack of space. Similar comments apply to n-ary relations for n > 2.
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Here is one result about prelogical predicates that does not generalize in the obvious way to prelogical
relations:
PROPOSITION 3.5. A prelogical predicate over a reachable lambda applicative structureA is a logical
predicate onA. (A lambda -applicative structureA is reachable if for any a ∈ [[σ ]]A there is a closed
-term M : σ such that a = [[M : σ ]]A.)
Proof. By a straightforward induction, or alternatively as a corollary of Lemma 4.2 below.
A prelogical relation over reachable lambda applicative structures A and B is not necessarily a
logical relation over A and B, because what is required to apply Proposition 3.5 is reachability for the
product structure A × B: for any 〈a, b〉 ∈ [[σ ]]A×B there needs to be a closed -term M : σ such that
〈a, b〉 = [[M : σ ]]A×B = 〈[[M : σ ]]A, [[M : σ ]]B〉.
The fact that prelogicality is strictly weaker than logicality is demonstrated by the following examples
which also provide a number of general methods for defining prelogical relations.
EXAMPLE 3.6. For any signature  and lambda -applicative structure, the predicate P defined by
Pσ (v) ⇔ v is the value of a closed -term M : σ
is a prelogical predicate overA. (In fact,P is the least such—see Proposition 5.8 below.) Now, consider
the signature  containing the type constant nat and term constants 0 : nat and succ : nat → nat and let
A be the full type hierarchy over N where 0 and succ have their usual interpretations. P is not a logical
predicate over A: any function f ∈ [[nat → nat]]A, including functions that are not lambda definable,
takes values in P to values in P and so must itself be in P .
EXAMPLE 3.7. The identity relation on a lambda applicative structure is a prelogical relation but it
is logical iff the structure is extensional.
EXAMPLE 3.8. A -homomorphism between lambda -applicative structures A and B is a type-
indexed family of functions {hσ : [[σ ]]A → [[σ ]]B}σ∈Types () such that for any term constant c : σ in ,
hσ ([[c]]A) = [[c]]B, hτ (Appσ,τA f a) = Appσ,τB hσ→τ ( f ) hσ (a), and hσ→τ ([[ ✄ λx :σ.M : σ → τ ]]AηA ) =
[[✄λx :σ.M : σ → τ ]]Bh(ηA) where h(ηA) = {x → hσ (ηA(x))} for all x : σ in . Any -homomorphism
is a prelogical relation. In particular, interpretation of terms in a lambda applicative structure with respect
to an environment, viewed as a relation from the lambda applicative structure of terms, is a prelogical
relation but is not in general a logical relation.
EXAMPLE 3.9. Prelogical predicates over a lambda applicative structure A are the natural notion
of substructures of A since they require closure under the available operations; see Proposition 4.2
below. When considering extensional structures, we additionally require substructures to be extensional.
Logical predicates are unnecessarily constrained for this purpose.
EXAMPLE 3.10. Let A and B be lambda applicative structures and define Rσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A × [[σ ]]B by
Rσ (a, b) for a ∈ [[σ ]]A, b ∈ [[σ ]]B iff there is a closed term M : σ such that [[M : σ ]]A = a and
[[M : σ ]]B = b. This is a prelogical relation but it is not in general a logical relation. Generalizing, the
inverse of any prelogical relation is obviously prelogical and according to Proposition 5.6 below the
composition of any two prelogical relations is prelogical. Then observe that the above relation is just
the composition of closed term interpretation in B (which is prelogical according to Example 3.8) and
the inverse of closed term interpretation in A.
EXAMPLE 3.11. Let A1, . . . ,Am be lambda applicative structures. There are several ways of gener-
ating an n-ary prelogical relation from an m-ary one R ⊆ A1 × · · · ×Am when n < m. Projection of
any n-tuple of components yields an n-ary prelogical relation, for example π1,2(R) ⊆ A1 ×A2. Another
notation for this is ∃, defined as follows: (∃R)σ = {〈a2, . . . , am〉 | ∃a1 ∈ [[σ ]]A1 .〈a1, a2, . . . , am〉 ∈
Rσ }. The dual of this is ∀, which is another way of reducing the arity of a prelogical relation:
(∀R)σ = {〈a2, . . . , am〉 | ∀a1 ∈ [[σ ]]A1 .〈a1, a2, . . . , am〉 ∈ Rσ }. Finally, if Ai =A j for some i, j ≤ m
then we can take the subset of tuples in R having the same values in positions i and j : ( filter R)σ =
{〈a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , am〉 | 〈a1, . . . , am〉 ∈Rσ and ai = a j }. This amounts to a projection of the in-
tersection of R with the cartesian product of the Al’s for l = i, j and the diagonal over Ai ×A j . All
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n-ary prelogical relations can be generated from m-ary prelogical relations such that n < m using any
of these: to obtain S, apply any of the above to S × A1 × · · · × A1 or alternatively, for the case of
projection and filtering, to {〈a1, . . . , an, a1, . . . , a1〉 | 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ S}. If R is a logical relation then
so is ∀R, but the projection and filtering of R are not logical relations in general.
EXAMPLE 3.12. Plotkin’s I-relations [23] give rise to prelogical relations. The family of relations
on the full type hierarchy consisting of the tuples which are in a given I-relation at a given world
(alternatively, at all worlds) is a prelogical relation which is not in general a logical relation.
A related example concerning Kripke logical relations with varying arity [10] is postponed to
Section 6 to allow the reader to first become more familiar with prelogical relations.
EXAMPLE 3.13. LetA be an applicative structure. Given order relations Rb on [[b]]A for each base type
b, we can define the hereditarily monotonic functionals as the equivalence classes of those elements
of A which are self-related with respect to the following inductively defined family of relations on
A×A:
Rσ→τ ( f, g) iff ∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A.∀b ∈ [[σ ]]A.Rσ (a, b) ⇒ (Rτ (AppA f a, AppAga)
∧ Rτ (AppA f a, AppA f b)
∧ Rτ (AppAga, AppAgb)).
(This defines simultaneously at each type both the class of functionals we are interested in and the order
relation itself.) This method defines a prelogical relation which is not in general a logical relation.
Gandy’s hereditarily strict monotonic functionals [6] can be defined using the above technique with
just a small modification of the clause for functionals.
Rσ→τ ( f, g) iff ∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A.∀b ∈ [[σ ]]A.
Rσ (a, b) ⇒ ( f = g ⇒ (Rτ\τ )(AppA f a, AppAga)
∧
a = b ⇒ ((Rτ\τ )(AppA f a, AppA f b)
∧ (Rτ\τ )(AppAga, AppAgb)))
Again we have a prelogical relation (with respect to the language of λI ) which is not in general a logical
relation.
EXAMPLE 3.14. We can define the continuous functionals, as used in models of PCF, using the same
technique. LetA be the full type hierarchy over a given set of base types, and assume that CPO-relations
Rb on [[b]]A are given. We can define simultaneously at each type both the class of functionals which
are continuous and the CPO-relation itself. Namely, define inductively
Rσ→τ ( f, g) iff ∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A.∀b ∈ [[σ ]]A.
Rσ (a, b) ⇒ (Rτ (AppA f a, AppAgb)
∧ f and g continuous w.r.t. Rσ and Rτ ).
In the above definition, continuity has to be taken in the obvious sense, namely (any representative of)
the supremum of a directed set w.r.t. Rσ is mapped into (a representative of) the supremum w.r.t. Rτ
of the images of the directed sets. For the definition to make sense we only need to check that Rσ→τ
induces a CPO-relation on the equivalence classes modulo Rσ→τ itself. But this is straightforward.
Again, the continuous functionals are the equivalence classes of those elements ofA which are self-
related by Rσ→τ and the CPO-relation is the order relation induced on these equivalence classes by
Rσ→τ itself. Again, R is a prelogical relation, which is not logical.
4. THE BASIC LEMMA
We will now consider the extension of the Basic Lemma to prelogical relations. In contrast to
Lemma 1.2, we get a two-way implication which says that the requirements on prelogical relations are
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exactly strong enough to ensure that the Basic Lemma holds. The reverse implication fails for logical
relations as Example 3.6 shows (for logical predicates).
LEMMA 4.1 (Basic Lemma for prelogical relations). Let R = {Rσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A × [[σ ]]B}σ∈Types () be a
family of relations over lambda -applicative structuresA andB. ThenR is a prelogical relation iff for
all -environments ηA, ηB such that R(ηA, ηB) and every -term ✄M : σ, Rσ ([[✄M : σ ]]AηA , [[✄
M : σ ]]BηB ).
Proof. ⇒: The proof is by induction on the structure of M . For variables, we use the assumption
that R(ηA, ηB). For constants, we use the fact that prelogical relations are required to respect constants.
For an application ✄M N : τ , we use the inductive hypothesis for M and N and the fact that prelogical
relations are closed under application. As for  ✄ λx :σ.M : σ → τ , by the induction hypothesis
we know that for all , x : σ -environments η′A, η′B such that R,x : σ (η′A, η′B) we have Rσ ([[, x : σ ✄
M : σ ]]A
η′A
, [[, x : σ✄M : σ ]]B
η′B
). If Rσ (a, b) then applying this to η′A = ηA[x → a] and η′B = ηB[x → b]
and taking the condition in the definition of prelogical relations gives the desired result.
⇐: The first condition of algebraic relations follows by taking M to be x y and ηA = {x → f, y → a}
and ηB = {x → g, y → b} and the second condition for a term constant c follows by taking M to be
c. The additional condition for prelogical relations holds a fortiori.
The “only if” direction of this result is the analogue in our setting of the general version of the Basic
Lemma in [19], but where R is only required to be prelogical. For combinatory algebras, the case of
lambda abstraction is handled via conversion to an equivalent combinatory term; comparing this proof
with the standard proof of the Basic Lemma, where this case uses the reverse implication in the definition
of logical relations, exposes the main idea a little more clearly.
If one applies the Basic Lemma for prelogical relations to Henkin models, the “only if” part of
the result is exactly the usual formulation (Lemma 1.2 above), except that R is only required to be
prelogical.
The Basic Lemma is intimately connected with the concept of lambda definability. This is most
apparent in the unary case:
LEMMA 4.2 (Basic Lemma for prelogical predicates). Let P = {Pσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A}σ∈Types () be a family
of predicates over a lambda -applicative structure A. Then P is a prelogical predicate iff it is closed
under lambda definability: P(η) and  ✄ M : σ implies Pσ ([[ ✄ M : σ ]]Aη ).
5. PROPERTIES OF PRELOGICAL RELATIONS
A logical relation on lambda applicative structures is prelogical provided it is admissible in the
following sense.
DEFINITION 5.1 (Mitchell). A logical relationR on lambda applicative structuresA and B is admis-
sible if given -environments ηA and ηB such that R(ηA, ηB), and terms , x : σ ✄ M, N : τ ,
∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A, b ∈ [[σ ]]B.Rσ (a, b) ⇒ Rτ ([[, x : σ ✄ M : τ ]]AηA[x →a], [[, x : σ ✄ N : τ ]]BηB[x →b]
)
implies
∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A, b ∈ [[σ ]]B.Rσ (a, b) ⇒ Rτ (AppA[[ ✄ λx :σ.M : σ → τ ]]AηAa,
AppB[[ ✄ λx :σ.N : σ → τ ]]BηBb
)
.
PROPOSITION 5.2. Any admissible logical relation on lambda applicative structures is a prelogical
relation.
Proof. Admissibility plus the reverse implication in the definition of logical relations gives the
property in the definition of prelogical relations.
COROLLARY 5.3. Any logical relation on combinatory algebras is a prelogical relation.
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Proof. Logical relations on combinatory algebras are always admissible. Alternatively, apply
Proposition 3.3.
To understand why the composition of logical relations R over A and B and S over B and C might
not be a logical relation, it is instructive to look at examples. When composition fails, the problem is
often that the interpretation of some function type in B has “too few values.” But even if we take logical
relations over full type hierarchies, where all possible values of function types are present, composition
can fail because the required “missing link” in B is not a function:
EXAMPLE 5.4. Let  contain just two type constants, b and b′. Consider three full type hierarchies
A,B, C which interpret b and b′ as follows: [[b]]A = {∗} = [[b′]]A; [[b]]B = {∗} and [[b′]]B = {◦, •};
[[b]]C = {◦, •} = [[b′]]C . Let R be the logical relation over A and B induced by Rb = {〈∗, ∗〉} and
Rb′ = {〈∗, ◦〉, 〈∗, •〉} and let S be the logical relation over B and C induced by Sb = {〈∗, ◦〉, 〈∗, •〉}
and Sb′ = {〈◦, ◦〉, 〈•, •〉}. S ◦R is not a logical relation because it does not relate the identity function
in [[b]]A → [[b′]]A to the identity function in [[b]]C → [[b′]]C . The problem is that the only two functions
in [[b]]B → [[b′]]B are {∗ → ◦} and {∗ → •}, and S does not relate these to the identity in C.
EXAMPLE 5.5. In the previous example, add a type constant bool and a term constant c : (b →
b′) → bool to . Let [[bool]]A = [[bool]]B = [[bool]]C = {true, false} and takeRbool and Sbool to be the
identity. In each model, let the interpretation of c take constant functions to true and all other functions
to false. The resulting R and S are logical relations. As before, S ◦R is not a logical relation but now
the restriction of S ◦R to base types cannot be lifted to a logical relation either: this would relate the
identity function in [[b]]A → [[b′]]A (which is a constant function) to every function in [[b]]C → [[b′]]C ,
but then the constant function in A would be related to nonconstant functions in C, and so [[c]]A could
not be related to [[c]]C , otherwise true would be related to false.
PROPOSITION 5.6. The composition S ◦R of prelogical relations R over A,B and S over B, C is a
prelogical relation over A, C.
Proof. A proof from the definition is not at all straightforward, but Lemma 4.1 says that prelogicality
is equivalent to a property of relations that is obviously closed under composition.
Obviously, closure under composition opens the way to the use of categories in which prelogical
relations are morphisms. Many properties of prelogical relations could then be expressed using the
language of category theory, but we do not pursue this here.
Composition of relations is definable in terms of product, intersection, and projection:
S ◦R = π1,3(A× S ∩ R× C).
Closure of prelogical relations under these operations is a more basic property than closure under
composition and is not specific to binary relations. We have:
PROPOSITION 5.7. Prelogical relations are closed under intersection, product, projection, permuta-
tion, and ∀. Logical relations are closed under product, permutation, and ∀ but not under intersection
or projection.
To see that logical relations are not closed under intersection, consider two logical predicates P,P ′
over A whose intersection at base types is empty. For any logical predicate Q over A which is empty
at base types, it is easy to show by induction that for each type σ , either Qσ = [[σ ]]A or Qσ = ∅. But
in general P ∩ P ′ does not have this property.
Concerning closure under projection, recallS from Example 5.4 and observe that π2(S) is not a logical
predicate: π2(S)b = [[b]]C and π2(S)b′ = [[b′]]C but π2(S)b→b′ does not contain the identity function.
Other classes of relations satisfy different closure properties. For instance, I-relations are obviously
closed under product, permutation, and ∀, and it is easy to see that they are also closed under intersection.
They are not closed under composition by Example 5.4 mutatis mutandis, and since composition is defin-
able in terms of product, intersection, and projection it follows that they are not closed under projection.
A consequence of closure under intersection is that given a property P of relations that is preserved
under intersection, there is always a least prelogical relation satisfying P . We then have the following
lambda-definability result (recall Example 3.6 above):
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PROPOSITION 5.8. The least prelogical predicate over a given lambda -applicative structure con-
tains exactly those elements that are the values of closed -terms.
In a signature with no term constants, a logical relation may be constructed by defining a relation R
on base types and using the definition to “lift” R inductively to higher types. The situation is different
for prelogical relations: there are in general many prelogical liftings of a given R, one being of course its
lifting to a logical relation (provided this gives an admissible relation). But since the property of lifting
a given R is preserved under intersection, the least prelogical lifting of R is also a well-defined relation.
Similarly, the least prelogical extension of a given family of relations is well-defined for any signature.
Notice that liftingR to a logical relation is not possible in general for signatures containing higher-order
term constants; see Example 5.5 (and see [19] for a way of accommodating least fixed-point operators).
Extension is also problematic: the cartesian product A × A is a logical relation that trivially extends
any binary relation on A, but this is uninteresting. Further ways of defining prelogical relations are
indicated by the examples at the end of Section 3 and in Section 6.
It is easy to see that prelogical relations are not closed under union. And even in a signature with
no term constants, the set of prelogical relations that lift a given relation R on base types cannot be
endowed with a lattice structure in general. But the only logical relation in this set is one of its maximal
elements under inclusion.
6. KRIPKE LOGICAL RELATIONS WITH VARYING ARITY
In [10], Jung and Tiuryn give the following variant of the notion of logical relations:
DEFINITION 6.1 (Jung and Tiuryn). Let C be a small category of sets and let A be a Henkin model.
A Kripke logical relation with varying arity (KLRwVA for short) over A is a family of relations Rwσ
indexed by objects w of C and types σ of Types(), where the elements of Rwσ are tuples of elements
from [[σ ]]A indexed by the elements of w, such that:
• If f : v → w is a map in C and Rwσ 〈a j 〉 j∈w then Rvσ 〈a f (i)〉i∈v .
• Rwσ→τ 〈g j 〉 j∈w iff ∀ f : v → w.∀〈ai 〉i∈v.Rvσ 〈ai 〉i∈v ⇒ Rvτ 〈AppAg f (i)ai 〉i∈v .
• Rwσ 〈[[c]]A〉 j∈w for every term constant c : σ in .
The above formulation extends Jung and Tiuryn’s definition to take term constants into account.
KLRwVAs give rise to prelogical relations in a similar way to I-relations, see Example 3.12: the
family of relations consisting of the w-indexed tuples that are in a given KLRwVA at world w is a |w|-
ary prelogical relation which is not in general a logical relation, and those elements that are invariant
under a given KLRwVA (i.e., a ∈ [[σ ]]A such that Rwσ 〈a〉 j∈w for all w) also form a prelogical predicate.
More interesting is the fact that every prelogical relation can be obtained in both these ways. We give
the unary case first.
PROPOSITION 6.2. Let P = {Pσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A}σ∈Types () be a family of predicates over a Henkin model
A. The following are equivalent.
1. P is a prelogical predicate.
2. P is the set of elements of A that appear at some world of cardinality 1 for some KLRwVA.
3. P is the set of elements of A that are invariant under some KLRwVA.
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2: Just as in the proof of Lemma 4 in [10], but using terms over  expanded by term
constants for all values inA. The proof assumes thatA is a full type hierarchy but it extends to Henkin
models by a minor change of notation.
2 ⇐ 1: From the definitions.
2 ⇔ 3: This follows from the fact that in the KLRwVA constructed in the proof of 1 ⇒ 2, there is
only one world of cardinality 1, which is the final object in the category C.
The binary and n-ary cases are obtained by applying the above construction to (n-ary) product
structures, or, in what amounts to essentially the same thing, to modifying the structure of the category
of worlds. If we work out this latter case we then obtain the (apparently more) general result:
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PROPOSITION 6.3. LetR = {Rσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A × · · ·× [[σ ]]A}σ∈Types () be a family of n-ary relations over
a Henkin model A. R is a prelogical relation iff it is the set of n-tuples of A which appear at some
world of cardinality n for some KLRwVA.
Finally we point out that the modification to Jung and Tiuryn’s result hinted at in the proof, together
with Theorem 3 in [10], can be used to generalize Jung and Tiuryn’s lambda-definability result (their
Theorem 5) to signatures containing term constants; cf. [2].
7. PRELOGICAL RELATIONS VIA COMPOSITION OF LOGICAL RELATIONS
Our weakening of the definition of logical relations may appear to be ad hoc, but for extensional
structures it turns out to be the minimal weakening that is closed under composition. There are variants
of this result for several different classes of models. We give the version for Henkin models.
THEOREM 7.1. Let A and B be Henkin models and let R be a prelogical relation over A and B.
Then R factors into a composition of three logical relations over Henkin models.
Proof Idea. The key idea is to extend A and B to models A[Y ] and B[Y ] in such a way that R[Y ],
a minimally extended version of R, becomes a logical relation on A[Y ] and B[Y ]. These models are
obtained by adding indeterminates with generic behaviour to the carrier sets ofA and B, which ensures
that the condition ∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A[Y ].∀b ∈ [[σ ]]B[Y ].R[Y ]σ (a, b) ⇒ R[Y ]τ (AppA[Y ] f a, AppB[Y ]gb) holds
only for f ∈ [[σ → τ ]]A and g ∈ [[σ → τ ]]B such that Rσ → τ ( f, g). Roughly speaking, we have that for
any indeterminate y : σ , R[Y ]τ (AppA[Y ] f y, AppB[Y ]gy) iff Rσ → τ ( f, g). ThenR is the composition of
the “embedding” of A in A[Y ], R[Y ], and the inverse of the “embedding” of B in B[Y ]. (The word
“embedding” is inaccurate since these are not set-theoretic functions. The inverse of the “embedding”
of A in A[Y ] is a partial surjection in the sense of Section 8.4.1 of [19], and likewise for B.)
A detailed proof may be found in the Appendix.
It is an open problem whether or not Theorem 7.1 holds if we take the composition of two logical
relations rather than three.
COROLLARY 7.2. The class of binary prelogical relations on Henkin models is the closure under
composition of the class of logical relations on such structures.
This gives the following lambda-definability result:
COROLLARY 7.3. Let A be a Henkin model and a ∈ [[σ ]]A. Then 〈a, a〉 belongs to all relations over
A×A obtained by composing logical relations iff a = [[M : σ ]]A for some closed -term M : σ .
Proof. By Corollary 7.2 and a binary version of Proposition 5.8.
The proof of Theorem 7.1 can be generalized to n-ary relations by repeating the same construction
in each component and taking an appropriately generalized notion of composition. This yields the
following structure theorem:
THEOREM 7.4. For any arity n, the class of all n-ary prelogical relations is obtained by closing the
class of all logical relations under intersection and then taking projections.
One can see from the proof of Theorems 7.1 and 7.4 that we can rephrase these results by saying that
every prelogical relation over a lambda applicative structure is the intersection of two logical relations
on a superstructure of A, one of which is An itself; or equivalently, the restriction to A of a logical
relation on a superstructure of A. Moreover, as superstructure we can always take the extension of A
with infinitely many indeterminates at each type. Formally, denoting by R ⊆ A the fact that R is a
prelogical predicate over A, and by R  A the fact that R is a logical predicate over A, we have:
PROPOSITION 7.5. Suppose R ⊆ A. Then there exists A′ and R′ such that A  A′, R′  A′ and
R = A ∩R′.
Proof. Simply take R′ = R[X ] and A′ = A[X ], where these extensions with indeterminates are
as in the proof of Theorem 7.1 in the Appendix.
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For the remainder of this section we shall focus again on the case of binary relations.
Corollary 7.2 does not hold if we restrict ourselves to considering just finite full type hierarchies:
given an element a of a finite structure, it turns out to be co-r.e. whether the pair 〈a, a〉 belongs to all
binary relations which are obtainable by closing logical relations under intersection and projection (and
hence by closure under composition), while by Proposition 5.8 and [12] it is not co-r.e. whether 〈a, a〉
belongs to all binary prelogical relations. In the case of arbitrary full type hierarchies, the question is
open: the proof of Theorem 7.1 fails if we take a full type hierarchy in place ofA[X ], and we conjecture
that Corollary 7.2 does not hold.
For nonextensional structures the notion of prelogical relations is not the minimal weakening that
gives closure under composition. The following variant is the minimal weakening for this case.
DEFINITION 7.6. An algebraic relation is extensional if whenever Rσ→τ ( f, g), f is extensionally
equal to f ′ and g is extensionally equal to g′, we have Rσ→τ ( f ′, g′).
All prelogical relations over extensional structures are automatically extensional, and all logical
relations over applicative structures (even nonextensional ones) are automatically extensional as well.
PROPOSITION 7.7. Let A and B be combinatory algebras and let R be an extensional prelogical
relation over A and B. Then R factors into a composition of three logical relations.
Proof. As for Theorem 7.1 except that we need to take the extensional collapse over A and B
respectively in the construction of A[X ] and B[X ]. The fact that R is extensional is needed to show
that the embeddings are logical relations.
COROLLARY 7.8. The class of extensional prelogical relations on combinatory algebras is the closure
under composition of the class of logical relations on such structures.
These results may suggest that our definition of prelogical relations on nonextensional structures
should be strengthened by requiring the relation to be extensional, but this would make the reverse
implication of the Basic Lemma fail. So although the notion of extensional prelogical relations is the
minimal weakening that gives closure under composition, these are stronger than necessary to give the
Basic Lemma.
It would be interesting to continue the above investigations to characterize classes of relations gen-
erated by logical relations under operations such as intersection, projection, or filtering, particularly on
full type hierarchies.
8. REPRESENTATION INDEPENDENCE AND DATA REFINEMENT
Logical relations have been applied to explain the fact that the behaviour of programs does not
depend on the way that data types are represented, but only on what can be observed about them using
the operations that are provided. “Behaviour of programs” is captured by the notion of observational
equivalence.
DEFINITION 8.1. LetA and B be lambda -applicative structures and let OBS, the observable types,
be a subset of Types(). ThenA is observationally finer than B with respect to OBS, writtenA ≤OBS B,
if for any two closed terms M, N : σ for σ ∈ OBS such that [[M : σ ]]A = [[N : σ ]]A we have [[M : σ ]]B =
[[N : σ ]]B.
A and B are observationally equivalent with respect to OBS, written A ≡OBS B, if A ≤OBS B and
B ≤OBS A.
It is usual to take OBS to be the “built-in” types for which equality is decidable, for instance bool
and/or nat. Then A and B are observationally equivalent iff it is not possible to distinguish between
them by performing computational experiments.
Mitchell [19] (cf. [18]) gives the following representation independence result:
THEOREM 8.2 (Mitchell). Let  be a signature that includes a type constant nat, and let A and B
be Henkin models, with [[nat]]A = [[nat]]B = N. If there is a logical relation R over A and B with
Rnat the identity relation on natural numbers, thenA ≡{nat} B. Conversely, ifA ≡{nat} B,  provides a
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closed term for each element of N having the same value in A and B, and  contains no higher-order
functions, then there is a logical relation R over A and B with Rnat the identity relation.
The statement of this theorem is slightly different from that in [19]—there is an additional minor
technical requirement in the second part—because we use a more general notion of observational
equivalence than Mitchell does in order to state Theorem 8.4 below.
The following example (Exercise 8.5.6 in [19]) shows that the requirement that  contains no higher-
order functions is necessary.
EXAMPLE 8.3. Let  have type constant nat and term constants 0, 1, 2, . . . : nat and f : (nat →
nat) → nat. Let A be the full type hierarchy over [[nat]]A = N with 0, 1, 2, . . . interpreted as usual
and [[ f ]]A(g) = 0 for all g : N → N. Let B be like A but with [[ f ]]B(g) = 0 if g is computable and
[[ f ]]B(g) = 1 otherwise. Since the difference betweenA and B cannot be detected by evaluating terms,
A ≡{nat} B. But there is no logical relation over A and B which is the identity relation on nat: if R is
logical then Rnat→nat(g, g) for any g : N→ N, and then Rnat(AppA[[ f ]]Ag, AppB[[ f ]]Bg), which gives
a contradiction if g is noncomputable.
We will strengthen this result by showing that prelogical relations characterize observational equiv-
alence for all signatures. We also generalize to arbitrary sets of observable types and remove the
requirement that elements of observable types are denoted by closed terms. This characterization is
obtained as a corollary of the following theorem which is a strengthening of Lemma 8.2.17 in [19],
again made possible by using prelogical relations in place of logical relations.
THEOREM 8.4. Let A and B be lambda -applicative structures and let OBS ⊆ Types (). Then
A ≤OBS B iff there exists a prelogical relation over A and B which is a partial function on OBS.
Proof. ⇐: Suppose thatR is a prelogical relation overA and B which is a partial function on OBS
and let [[M : σ ]]A = [[N : σ ]]A for σ ∈ OBS. Apply the Basic Lemma to both sides and use the fact that
Rσ is a partial function to get [[M : σ ]]B = [[N : σ ]]B.
⇒: Take the relation defined in Example 3.10.
Mitchell’s Lemma 8.2.17 is the “if” direction of this theorem for Henkin models where OBS =
Types () but R is required to be logical rather than just prelogical. Notice that the “only if” direction
of Theorem 8.4 does not hold for logical relations, even in the absence of term constants.
COROLLARY 8.5. Let A and B be lambda -applicative structures and let OBS ⊆ Types (). Then
A ≡OBS B iff there exists a prelogical relation overA and B which is a partial function on OBS in both
directions.
The following result (instantiated to Henkin models) is the special case of Corollary 8.5 that most
directly corresponds to Theorem 8.2.
COROLLARY 8.6. Let  be a signature that includes a type constant nat and let A and B be lambda
-applicative structures with [[nat]]A = [[nat]]B = N such that  provides a closed term for each
element of N having the same value in A and B. There is a prelogical relation R over A and B with
Rnat the identity relation on natural numbers iff A ≡{nat} B.
Proof. Under the condition that [[nat]]A = [[nat]]B = N, the availability of a closed term for each
element of N having the same value in A and B means that the requirement that Rnat is the identity
relation is equivalent to the requirement that it is a partial function in both directions.
EXAMPLE 8.7. Revisiting Example 8.3, the prelogical relation constructed in Example 3.10 has the
required property and it does not relate noncomputable functions since they are not lambda definable.
Following [29], it would be interesting to try to characterize finer notions of observational equiva-
lence, e.g., elementary equivalence in first-order logic with equality restricted to observable types. In
Example 8.3, note that the sentence ∀g, h : nat → nat. f (g) = f (h) holds in A but not in B.
The standard treatment of data refinement in the context of typed lambda calculus, originating with
Reynolds but described most clearly in Section 2 of [34], uses logical relations to prove the correctness
of refinements: writeA RB to indicate thatB is a refinement ofA as witnessed by the logical relationR
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overA and B, which is required to be identity on observable types. But then, given refinementsA RB
and B S C, the composition S ◦Rmay not be a logical relation and so it cannot in general be used as a
witness for the composed refinementA C. (In fact, sometimes there is no witness forA C at all.)
This is at odds with the stepwise nature of refinement, and the transitivity of the underlying concept of
refinement expressed in terms of observational equivalence. It is one source of examples demonstrating
the incompleteness of this proof method; there are other examples that do not involve composition of
refinement steps, see for instance Section 5 of [8]. A consequence of Theorem 8.2 is that this proof
method is complete in the absence of higher-order term constants (if the signature provides a closed
term for each element of observable type having the same value in A and B).
If prelogical relations are used in place of logical relations, then the fact that the composition of
prelogical relations is again a prelogical relation (Proposition 5.6) explains why stepwise refinement
is sound. It follows directly from Corollary 8.5 that the result is a sound and complete proof method
for proving the correctness of data refinements (provided we relax the condition on observable types
to require a partial function in both directions rather than identity, which also allows us to lift the
requirement on closed terms of observable types). This opens the way to further development of the
foundations of data refinement along the lines of the first-order algebraic treatment in [30], and this is
pursued in [8]. There, constructive prelogical refinement is a relation between specifications, written
SP OBS
δ
SP ′. This incorporates a derived signature morphism δ defining the types and constants in
the signature of SP by giving terms over the signature of SP′, which allows any model B over the
signature of SP′ to be transformed to a model B|δ over the signature of SP. This refinement is correct if
for any B ∈ Mod(SP′) there is some A ∈ Mod(SP) with a prelogical relation R over A and B|δ which
is a partial function on OBS in both directions. Making refinement into a relation on specifications
and adding the construction described by δ gives a nonsymmetric relation which incorporates the idea
that refinement is a reduction of one as-yet-unsolved problem to another, which is a better fit with the
real-life phenomenon being modelled.
9. OTHER APPLICATIONS
There are many other applications of logical relations. Take for instance the proof of strong normal-
ization of λ→ in [19]: one defines an admissible logical predicate on a lambda applicative structure of
terms by lifting the predicate on base types consisting of the strongly normalizing terms to higher types,
proves that the predicate implies strong normalization, and then applies the general version of the Basic
Lemma to give the result. The pattern for proofs of confluence, completeness of leftmost reduction, etc.,
is the same, sometimes with logical relations in place of logical predicates. There are also constructions
that do not involve the Basic Lemma because the relations defined are not logical relations, but that
include proofs following the same lines as the proof of the Basic Lemma. Examples include Gandy’s
proof that the hereditarily strict monotonic functionals model λI terms [6], Plotkin’s proof that lambda
terms satisfy any I-relation [23], and Jung and Tiuryn’s proof that lambda terms satisfy any KLRwVA
at each arity (Theorem 3 of [10]).
All of these can be cast into a common mould by using prelogical relations rather than logical
relations. If a relation or predicate on a lambda applicative structure is logical and admissible, then it
is prelogical, and then the Basic Lemma for prelogical relations gives the result. Plotkin’s, Jung and
Tiuryn’s, and Gandy’s relations can be shown to be prelogical (in Gandy’s case with respect to λI ), see
Example 3.12, Section 6, and Example 3.13 respectively, and then the application of the Basic Lemma
for prelogical relations gives the result in these cases as well. In each case, however, the interesting part
of the proof is not the application of the Basic Lemma (or the argument that replaces its application in
the case of Gandy, Plotkin, and Jung and Tiuryn) but rather the construction of the relation and the proof
of its properties. The point of the analysis is not to say that this view makes the job easier but rather to
bring forward the common pattern in all of these proofs, which is suggestive of a possible methodology
for such proofs.
Proofs of completeness and other applications would make use of the following.
DEFINITION 9.1. A family of binary relations {Rσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A × [[σ ]]A}σ∈Types () over a -applicative
structureA is a partial equivalence relation (abbreviated PER) if it is symmetric and transitive for each
type.
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PROPOSITION 9.2. Let R be a PER on a -applicative structure A which is algebraic. Define the
quotient of A by R, written A/R, as follows:
• [[σ ]]A/R = [[σ ]]A/Rσ , i.e., the set of R-equivalence classes of objects a ∈ [[σ ]]A such that
Rσ (a, a).
• Appσ,τA/R [ f ]A/R [a]A/R = [Appσ,τA f a]A/R.
• [[c]]A/R = [[[c]]A]A/R for each term constant c : σ in .
Then:
1. Let A be a lambda applicative structure. Then A/R is a lambda applicative structure, with
[[ ✄ M : σ ]]A/RηA/R = [[[ ✄ M : σ ]]AηA ]A/R (where ηA(x) is a representative of the equivalence class
ηA/R(x)), iff R is prelogical.
2. Let A be a combinatory algebra. Then A/R is a combinatory algebra iff R is prelogical.
3. A/R is an extensional applicative structure iff its restriction to the substructure ofA consisting
of the elements in Dom(R) is a logical relation.
Proof. The first point amounts to showing that the interpretation function is well defined, namely
that R(ηA, η′A) ⇒ Rσ ([[ ✄ M : σ ]]AηA , [[ ✄ M : σ ]]Aη′A ), but this follows immediately from the Basic
Lemma for lambda applicative structures. The second point follows again from the Basic Lemma. The
last point is straightforward from the definitions.
The last part of the above proposition says that one application of logical relations, that is their use
in obtaining extensional structures by quotienting nonextensional structures—the so-called extensional
collapse—requires a relation that is logical (on a substructure) rather than merely prelogical.
The above proposition allows us to prove completeness for different classes of structures using the
traditional technique of quotienting an applicative structure of terms by a suitable relation defined
by provability in a calculus. For nonextensional structures, this is not possible using logical relations
because the relation defined by provability is prelogical or algebraic rather than logical.
At this point one could develop a theory analogous to that of homomorphisms, quotients, and sub-
structures in universal algebra, but we refrain from doing this here. One would expect analogues of the
usual theorems relating these three notions.
10. BEYOND λ→ AND APPLICATIVE STRUCTURES
Up to now we have been working in λ→, the simplest version of typed lambda calculus. We will now
briefly indicate how other type constructors could be treated so as to obtain corresponding results for
extended languages.
As a template, we shall discuss the case of product types. The syntax of types is extended by adding
the type form σ ×τ and the syntax of terms is extended by adding pairing 〈M, N 〉 and projections π1 M
and π2 M . If we regard these as additional term constants in the signature, e.g., 〈·, ·〉 : σ → τ → σ × τ
for all σ, τ , rather than as new term forms, then the definition of prelogical relations remains the same:
the condition on term constants says that, e.g., Rσ→τ→σ×τ ([[〈·, ·〉]]A, [[〈·, ·〉]]B) and this is all that is
required. For models that satisfy surjective pairing, this implies the corresponding condition on logical
relations, namely
Rσ×τ (a, b) iff Rσ (π1 a, π1 b) and Rτ (π2 a, π2 b).
The treatment of sum types σ + τ is analogous: we just require that inl : σ → σ + τ , inl : τ → σ + τ ,
and case : σ + τ → (σ → ρ) → (τ → ρ) → ρ take related arguments to related results. Notice that
this is also the only way to give the definition for logical relations with sum types since applying the
usual pattern yields
Rσ+τ (a, b) iff
∀ρ.( ∀ f ∈ [[σ → ρ]]A, f ′ ∈ [[σ → ρ]]B, g ∈ [[τ → ρ]]A, g′ ∈ [[τ → ρ]]B.
Rσ→ρ( f, f ′) ∧ Rτ→ρ(g, g′) ⇒ Rρ(case a f g, case b f ′ g′))
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which is not an inductive definition. This demonstrates that the pattern of definition for prelogical
relations is more robust than that for logical relations.
A type constructor that has received less attention in the literature is (finite) powerset, P(σ ). The
treatment would be like that of products and coproducts, given models containing a standard interpre-
tation of bool: we add term constants ∅ : P(σ ), {·} : σ → P(σ ), ∪ : P(σ ) → P(σ ) → P(σ ), and
∈: σ → P(σ ) → bool and require R P(σ )([[∅]]A, [[∅]]B) etc. For models in which the interpretation
of the powerset type and these new constants are as usual, this amounts to imposing the following
condition:
RP(σ )(α, β) iff ∀a ∈ α.∃b ∈ β.Rσ (a, b) and ∀b ∈ β.∃a ∈ α.Rσ (a, b).
Note that this is the same pattern used in defining bisimulations.
Various other kinds of types can be considered, including inductive and coinductive data types (see
[3]), universally and existentially quantified types (see [20]), and various flavours of dependent types.
We have not yet considered these in any detail, but we are confident that for any of them, one could
take any existing treatment of logical relations and modify it by weakening the condition on functions
as above without sacrificing the Basic Lemma. We expect that this would even yield improved results
as it has above, but this is just speculation.
We have so far restricted attention to structures modelling total functions. Admitting partial func-
tions involves consideration of typed partial combinatory algebras; cf. Section 5.6.2 of [19]: these are
combinatory algebras where App is a partial function, such that K xy↓ (and K xy = x), Sxy↓, and
Sxyz $ (xz)(yz). (As usual, t↓ denotes the fact that the term t is defined and t $ t ′ means that the two
terms t and t ′ are either both defined and equal or both undefined.) Typed partial combinatory algebras
are the appropriate setting for discussing call-by-value combinatory logic or lambda calculus. There is a
standard compilation of lambda terms into combinatory terms which maps values (variables, constants,
and abstractions) to defined terms.
The appropriate notion of prelogical relation for typed partial combinatory algebras coincides with the
standard one for combinatory algebras except that the condition for arrow types has to take undefinedness
into account. We use the condition
(A) If Rσ→τ ( f, g) then
∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A.∀b ∈ [[σ ]]B.Rσ (a, b) implies f a↑ ∧ gb↑
or f a↓ ∧ gb↓ ∧ Rτ ( f a, gb)
which yields both the Basic Lemma (modified slightly to take undefinedness into account) and closure
under composition.
Notice that if we had instead taken
(B) If Rσ→τ ( f, g) then
∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A.∀b ∈ [[σ ]]B.Rσ (a, b) implies f a↓ ∧ gb↓ ∧ Rτ ( f a, gb),
then there would be structures for which there are no prelogical relations, for instance when such
structures interpret term constants that are not in the domain of the interpretation of other term constants.
If we had been too liberal, by taking
(C) If Rσ→τ ( f, g) then
∀a ∈ [[σ ]]A.∀b ∈ [[σ ]]B.Rσ (a, b) implies f a↓ ∧ gb↓ ⇒ Rτ ( f a, gb),
then closure under composition would fail. In both cases a revised version of the Basic Lemma would
hold. Interestingly, the notion of logical relation arising from (A) is not the one usually used for extracting
a typed partial combinatory algebra from an untyped partial combinatory algebra. This notion is the
one arising from (B).
A different dimension of generalization is to consider models having additional structure—e.g.,
Kripke applicative structures [21], presheaf models, or cartesian closed categories—for which logical
relations have been studied. We have not yet examined the details of this generalization but a correspond-
ing weakening of the definition would be interesting to consider. It is worth noting that Proposition 6.2
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links prelogical relations to KLRwVAs, which have a logical formulation over appropriate presheaf
categories as hinted in [10] and have been extended to cartesian closed categories in [2].
11. RELATED WORK
The definition of prelogical relations is not new. In [31], Schoett uses a first-order version of alge-
braic relations which he calls correspondences (see also simulations in [16] and weak homomorphisms
in [7]), and he conjectures (p. 281) that for Henkin models, what we have called prelogical relations
(formulated as in Proposition 3.3) would be closed under composition and yield the Basic Lemma. In
[17], Mitchell makes the same suggestion, referring to Schoett and also crediting Abramsky and Plotkin,
but as an assertion rather than a conjecture. The idea is not developed any further. An independent but
equivalent definition of prelogical relations over cartesian closed categories, based on the account of
logical relations in [14], is given in [24] where they are called lax logical relations. It is shown that
these compose, that the Basic Lemma holds, and that they coincide with prelogical relations, and an
axiomatic account is provided. Earlier, a closely related notion called L-relations was defined in [11]
and shown to compose. In contrast to [24] and [11], our treatment is elementary rather than categorical,
and covers also combinatory algebras. As far as assessing possible categorical generalizations of
prelogical relations, some real scientific work ought to be done first in relating the work in [2, 11, 24, 28]
(cf. [25, 26]). In an appropriate categorical setting, the very notion of logical relation appears to have al-
ready some desired properties of prelogical relations, which set-theoretical logical relations do not have:
e.g., they characterize λ-definable points [2], or capture observational equivalence [28] (cf. [25, 26]).
The appropriate categorical generalization of prelogical relations ought to have all the properties
of prelogical relations in Theorem 12.1 below (mutatis mutandis) as well as characterizing obser-
vational equivalence. It appears that a slight weakening of lax logical relations might be such a
notion.
Another very interesting connection appears with some recent work of Longley; see [13]. He has
used applicative morphisms, which are essentially total prelogical relations, to study the relationship
between various notions of computability.
Two papers that we came across only after writing this paper but which have some intriguing connec-
tions to some of our results and techniques, are [32] and [20]. We believe that the concept of prelogical
relation would have a beneficial impact on the presentation and understanding of their results.
In [32], Statman gives a characterization of the lambda-definable functionals of an arbitrary type
structure as the “stable solutions to systems of functional equations.” Without giving all the details, we
just say that a solution is stable if it is α-stable for all ordinals α, where 1-stability amounts to uniqueness
of the solution and a solution is α + 1-stable if it yields α-stable solutions under image and preimage
of partial surjective homomorphisms.
Now, partial surjective homomorphisms are just special logical relations, and so α-stability implies
stability under suitable α-fold composition of such logical relations. Not surprisingly, the numerology
of the number 3 surfaces also in this context, and Statman brilliantly proves that it is enough to look at
3-stable solutions!
Statman does not deal with systems of equations with arbitrary parameters (i.e., signatures). He
does not make direct use of indeterminates in proving his results, but these are implicit in the term
model of typed lambda calculus. It is not hard to imagine that the notion of prelogical relation and the
constructions in the proof of our Theorem 7.1 could shed some light into the essence of this result as
well as providing an alternative presentation and possibly a generalization to arbitrary signatures.
Although addressing the issue of logical relations for second-order lambda calculus, the gist of
some of Mitchell and Meyer’s results in [20] bears a similar connection to some of our results
on prelogical relations. In particular, in their Theorems 4 and 5 Mitchell and Meyer characterize
lambda-definable elements of a model and an appropriate notion of observational equivalence be-
tween models using logical relations over superstructures defined by adding indeterminates to the given
models.
Since [20] is an extended abstract, the proofs of these results cannot be analyzed. But on the basis of
our Proposition 7.5 and Corollary 8.5, both Theorems 4 and 5 in [20] appear rather plausible. Again, the
use of prelogical relations—if they had been available—would probably have allowed them to phrase
their results in a slightly more general fashion.
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12. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
Our feeling is that by introducing the notion of a prelogical relation we have, metaphorically and a little
immodestly, removed a “blind spot” in the existing intuition of the use and scope of logical relations and
related techniques. This is not to say that some specialists in the field have not previously contemplated
generalizations similar to ours, but they have not carried the investigation far enough. We believe that
in this paper we have exposed very clearly the fact that in many situations the use of logical relations
is unnecessarily restrictive. Using prelogical relations instead, we get improved statements of some
results (e.g., Theorem 8.4 and its corollaries), we encompass constructions that had previously escaped
the logical paradigm (e.g., Example 3.13), and we isolate the necessary and sufficient hypotheses for
many arguments to go through (e.g., Lemma 4.1). We have given several characterizations of prelogical
relations, summarized in the following theorem (for the unary case):
THEOREM 12.1. Let P = {Pσ ⊆ [[σ ]]A}σ∈Types () be a family of predicates over a Henkin model A.
The following are equivalent.
1. P is a prelogical predicate.
2. P is closed under lambda definability.
3. P is the set of elements of A that are invariant under some KLRwVA.
4. P is the set of elements ofA that are invariant under (or alternatively, the projection or ∀ of )
the composition of (three) logical relations.
Proof. 1 ⇔ 2 is Proposition 4.2, 1 ⇔ 3 is Proposition 6.2, and 1 ⇔ 4 is by Corollary 7.2.
The fact that there are so many conceptually independent ways of defining the same class of relations,
together with the fact that they characterize observational equivalence, suggests that it is a truly intrinsic
notion. Notice that Theorem 12.1(3) gives an inductive flavour to this concept which is not explicit in
the definition of prelogical relations. This apparent lack has been regarded as a weakness of the concept;
see e.g., p. 428–429 of [17].
Throughout the paper we have indicated possible directions of future investigation, e.g., suggesting
in Section 10 how to generalize to less elementary type structures. As we point out, there is a standard
methodology here: simply require the interpretations of the “relevant” constants in the two structures to
be related. Despite its simplicity, this methodology is extremely rewarding, and it allows us to harvest
serendipitous results also in related areas. A case in point is offered by PER models of System F,
where the extra latitude and flexibility given by defining the exponential PER prelogically allows for
a number of possibly novel natural model constructions. It is plausible that sharper chararacterizations
of representation independence similar to the one presented here for simple types will appear in richer
type disciplines.
There is a vast literature on logical relations in connection with areas such as parametricity, abstract
interpretation, etc. A treatment of these topics in terms of prelogical relations is likely to be as fruitful
and illuminating as it has proved to be for the classical example of a simply typed lambda calculus
presented here. One possible direction among many would be to study the impact of prelogical relations
on the presentation of fully abstract models as in, e.g., [15, 22, 27].
In view of the numerous results, connections, new perspectives, and yes, also some criticism, that
prelogical relations have brought with them, one can say that changing a ⇔ to ⇒ in the definition of
logical relations was like rubbing Aladdin’s lamp—or, some would say, like opening Pandora’s box!
APPENDIX
Here we give a detailed proof of the following theorem.
THEOREM 7.1. Let A and B be Henkin models and let R be a prelogical relation over A and B.
Then R factors into a composition of three logical relations over Henkin models.
See Section 7 for the idea of the proof. We proceed as follows:
• We define the model A[Y ] and the relation that embeds A in A[Y ] and show that this is a
logical relation (Lemma A.7). The same applies to B and B[Y ].
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• We define R[Y ] ⊆ A[Y ] × B[Y ] and show that it is a logical relation (Lemma A.9).
• Finally we show that R is the composition of the embedding of A in A[Y ], R[Y ], and the
inverse of the embedding of B in B[Y ] (Lemma A.10).
Let Y be a set of typed variables containing an infinite number of variables for each type in Types().
DEFINITION A.1. Let A be  augmented by a term constant ca : σ for each element a ∈ [[σ ]]A. Let
[Y ] (resp. A[Y ]) be  (resp. A) augmented by a term constant cy : σ , called an indeterminate,
for each variable y : σ in Y .
DEFINITION A.2. The Henkin model A[Y ] over [Y ] is the (closed) A[Y ]-term model of the
simply typed lambda calculus with β and η, and with δ-reductions describing the behaviour of each
constant ca with respect to other such constants (and with no δ-reductions involving the indeterminates).
This calculus is Church–Rosser and strongly normalizing so each term M has a unique normal form
ˆM . Although elements in A[Y ] are equivalence classes of terms, it is convenient to refer to them using
single terms, by which is meant the equivalence class containing that term. Since all terms in a given
equivalence class have the same normal form, we will sometimes write aˆ for an element a in A[Y ]. If
η is a -environment over A then ηc is the -environment over A[Y ] which assigns each variable x to
(the equivalence class of) cη(x).
Please note that A[Y ] is not the construction corresponding to the “free combinatory -algebra”
generated by the constants in A, which is more frequently used in the literature. Rather, it is the con-
struction corresponding to the “free -algebra” generated by the constants inA. So the interpretations
of pure closed lambda terms, such as K or S, are not preserved in the generic extension. For instance,
K = [[cK ]]A[Y ].
LEMMA A.3. If M →∗βηδ N for  ✄A M, N : σ, then for any -environment η over A, [[M]]Aη =
[[N ]]Aη in which we interpret each of the constants ca as a.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the derivation of M →∗βηδ N .
LEMMA A.4. Let  ✄ M, N : σ . If [[N ]]A[Y ]ηc = [[M]]A[Y ]η′c then [[N ]]Aη = [[M]]Aη′ .
Proof. If [[N ]]A[Y ]ηc = [[M]]A[Y ]η′c then N [ηc(x)/x for all x] and M[ηc(x)/x for all x] reduce to the
same normal form. By Lemma A.3, the reduction sequences that yield this normal form can be repro-
duced in A to give [[N ]]Aη = [[M]]Aη′ .
LEMMA A.5. Let ✄ M : σ and ✄[Y ] N : σ . If [[M]]A[Y ]ηc = [[N ]]A[Y ]ηc then ̂[[N ]]A[Y ]ηc is a A-term,
and moreover the βη-normal form of N contains no indeterminates.
Proof. The presence of indeterminates does not give rise to extra reductions, nor can indeterminates
be erased by the δ-reductions associated to the constants ca . Any indeterminate in the βη-normal form
of N would therefore falsify the hypothesis.
DEFINITION A.6. The embedding emb of A into A[Y ] is defined as follows:
embσ = {〈[[M]]Aη , [[M]]A[Y ]ηc
〉 ∣∣  ✄ M : σ and η a -environment over A
}
.
Although we call emb an embedding, this is inaccurate since it is never a set-theoretic function. To
be precise, it is the natural lifting to a logical relation of the embedding at base types. It is easy to check
however that emb−1 is a partial surjection.
LEMMA A.7. emb is a logical relation.
Proof. It is easy to see that each constant c in  is in relation to itself: just take M = c.
Furthermore, suppose embσ→τ ([[M]]Aη , [[M]]A[Y ]ηc ) and embσ ([[N ]]Aη′ , [[N ]]A[Y ]η′c ); we need to show
embτ (AppA[[M]]Aη [[N ]]Aη′ , AppA[Y ][[M]]A[Y ]ηc [[N ]]A[Y ]η′c ). Without loss of generality (because we can re-
name variables, and denotations depend only on variables which occur) we can assume that η = η′ and
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then the result follows from the definition of interpretation: AppA[[M]]Aη [[N ]]Aη = [[M N ]]Aη and similarly
for A[Y ].
It remains to prove the opposite direction of the implication. Suppose that whenever embσ (a, d),
embτ (AppA f a, AppA[Y ]gd). We need to show embσ→τ ( f, g). Consider the normal form gˆ of g. We claim
that gˆ is a A-term; i.e., it contains no indeterminates. We know that embσ (a, [[x]]A[Y ]ηc ) with ηc(x) = ca .
Since embτ (AppA f a, AppA[Y ]g[[x]]A[Y ]ηc ), there is a term  ✄ N : τ and -environment ξ such that
AppA[Y ]g[[x]]A[Y ]ηc = [[N ]]A[Y ]ξc . Again w.l.o.g. ξ = η, so ̂AppA[Y ]g[[x]]A[Y ]ηc is a A-term by Lemma A.5,
and then so is gˆ. Therefore, consider the -term M and environment η′c such that [[M]]A[Y ]η′c = gˆ: M is gˆ
with each constant ca replaced by a variable whichη′c maps to ca . But now we claim that f is extensionally
equal to [[M]]Aη′ . We have embτ (AppA f a, AppA[Y ][[M]]A[Y ]η′c ca) so emb
τ (AppA f a, [[Mz]]A[Y ]η′c[z →ca ]) for a
fresh variable z. By the definition of emb, there is a term  ✄ M ′ : τ and -environment η′′ such that
[[M ′]]Aη′′ = AppA f a and [[M ′]]A[Y ]η′′c = [[Mz]]
A[Y ]
η′c[z →ca ]. Again w.l.o.g., η
′′
c = η′c[z → ca]. Then [[M ′]]Aη′′ =
[[Mz]]Aη′′ by Lemma A.4, and thus AppA f a = AppA[[M]]Aη′a which shows that f is extensionally equal
to [[M]]Aη′ . So by extensionality, [[M]]Aη′ = f giving embσ→τ ( f, g).
We will need to refer to both emb ⊆ A×A[Y ] and emb ⊆ B × B[Y ] so we use the notation embA
for the former and embB for the latter.
DEFINITION A.8. The relation R[Y ] ⊆ A[Y ] × B[Y ] is defined as follows:
R[Y ]σ = {〈[[M]]A[Y ]ηc , [[M]]B[Y ]η′c
〉 ∣∣  ✄[Y ] M : σ and η, η′ are -environments
for A,B such that R(η, η′)}.
LEMMA A.9. R[Y ] is a logical relation.
Proof. Each constant c in [Y ] is in relation to itself: just take M = c. Furthermore, suppose
R[Y ]([[M]]A[Y ]ηc , [[M]]B[Y ]η′c ) and R[Y ]([[N ]]A[Y ]ηc , [[N ]]
B[Y ]
η′c
). (We should assume that we have different
environments for [[M]]A[Y ] and [[N ]]A[Y ] and for [[M]]B[Y ] and [[N ]]B[Y ], but without loss of generality
we can assume that theA[Y ]-environments are the same and similarly for B[Y ].) We need to show that
then R[Y ](AppA[Y ][[M]]A[Y ]ηc [[N ]]A[Y ]ηc , AppB[Y ][[M]]B[Y ]η′c [[N ]]
B[Y ]
η′c
). We get the result by the definition of
interpretation: AppA[Y ][[M]]A[Y ]ηc [[N ]]A[Y ]ηc = [[M N ]]A[Y ]ηc and similarly for B[Y ].
It remains to prove the opposite direction of the implication. Suppose we have f ∈A[Y ] and
g ∈B[Y ] such that for every [Y ]-term P and environments η, η′ for A and B such that R(η, η′),
R[Y ](AppA[Y ] f [[P]]A[Y ]ηc , AppB[Y ]g[[P]]B[Y ]η′c ). Then take P to be an indeterminate cy which does not
occur in ˆf or gˆ. (We need an infinite number of indeterminates to ensure that there is one that is
different from all those that are already used in the terms ˆf and gˆ.) We know that there exists a
[Y ]-term M and environments ξ, ξ ′ forA andB such that R(ξ, ξ ′), AppA[Y ] f [[cy]]A[Y ]ξc = [[M]]A[Y ]ξc and
AppB[Y ]g[[cy]]B[Y ]ξ ′c = [[M]]
B[Y ]
ξ ′c
. Consider the [Y ]-term Q = λcy .M . (Formally speaking, we should
really take λx .M[x/cy] so that we are abstracting a variable rather than a constant, but the meaning is
clear.) We claim that f is extensionally equal to [[Q]]A[Y ]ξc . Let a ∈ A[Y ]. Now consider the reduction se-
quences from AppA[Y ] f [[cy]]A[Y ]ξc and AppA[Y ][[λcy .M]]A[Y ]ξc [[cy]]A[Y ]ξc to a common reduct S. If we replace
all unbound occurrences of cy in these reduction sequences with a, we obtain valid reduction sequences
from AppA[Y ] f a and AppA[Y ][[λcy .M]]A[Y ]ξc a to the common reduct S[a/cy]. This works because cy is
“sterile,” with generic behaviour. Similarly, g is extensionally equal to [[Q]]B[Y ]ξ ′c . Therefore, sinceA[Y ]
and B[Y ] are extensional, R[Y ]( f, g).
LEMMA A.10. The composition of embA,R[Y ] and (embB)−1 is R.
Proof. It is easy to see that R is included in the composition: take M in Definition A.6 to be a
fresh variable, then if R(a, b), we have η(x) = a, ηc(x) = ca , η′c(x) = cb, η′(x) = b. As for the
converse, suppose ((embB)−1 ◦R[Y ] ◦ embA)(a, b). By definition of embA there exists a -term N and
environment ηA such that a = [[N ]]AηA. By definition of embB there exists a -term N ′ and environment
ηB such that b = [[N ′]]BηB. By definition of R[Y ] there exists a [Y ]-term M and environments η, η′
such that [[N ]]A[Y ]ηAc = [[M]]A[Y ]ηc , [[N ′]]
B[Y ]
ηBc = [[M]]
B[Y ]
η′c
and R(η, η′). W.l.o.g. we can assume that ηA = η
and ηB = η′ and that M is in βη-normal form. By Lemma A.5 we know that ̂[[M]]A[Y ]ηc and ̂[[M]]B[Y ]η′c
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are A- and B-terms respectively, and that M contains no indeterminates. By Lemma A.4 we know
that a = [[N ]]Aη = [[M]]Aη and b = [[N ′]]Bη = [[M]]Bη′ . So by the Basic Lemma, R(a, b).
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